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ABSTRACT
Economists emphasize two channels through which import liberalization affects productivity, one
operating between and the other within firms. According to the former, import competition triggers
market share reallocations between domestic firms with different technological capabilities (selection).
At the same time, imports can also improve firms' technologies through learning externalities (spillovers).
We present evidence for a sample of industrialized countries over the period 1973 to 2002. First, in
the long run, import liberalization lowers productivity in domestic industries through selection. This
finding confirms the prediction of models with firm heterogeneity, including Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), in which unilateral liberalization lowers the profits of domestic relative to foreign exporters.
Second, if imports involve advanced foreign technologies, liberalization also generates technological
learning that can on net raise domestic productivity. Third, for short time horizons of up to three years,
a surge in imports typically raises domestic productivity. Because the number of firms at home and
abroad does not change much in the short-run, new competition from foreign firms has a pro-competitive
effect. We also find that high entry barriers, especially regulation, slow down the process of market
share reallocation between firms. Over- all, the results support models in which trade triggers both
substantial selection and technological learning.
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The recent growth of international trade has made for a much more integrated world. Many
observers hold that trade contributes to the ￿ ow of ideas across borders because a major part
of imports are new products.1 These innovations positively a⁄ect productivity if they trigger
domestic technological learning within ￿rms. Importing high-technology intermediate goods
may also generate learning spillovers. How important, for example, were the United States
intermediate imports of the emerging Irish computer industry for the recent productivity
transformation of Ireland?2
International trade also changes the intensity of domestic competition and leads to pro-
ductivity selection through the reallocation of market shares between ￿rms that di⁄er in
their productivity (Melitz 2003). If trade barriers to a foreign market fall, this improves
the relative pro￿tability of high-productivity ￿rms, since low-productivity ￿rms tend to sell
only domestically. Weak ￿rms exit and market shares are reallocated to high-productivity
￿rms, which raises average productivity (positive selection). At the same time, this makes it
more di¢ cult for ￿rms of the liberalizing country￿ and speci￿cally its relatively strong ￿rms,
the potential exporters￿ to compete abroad. In the liberalizing country, thus, the pro￿ts for
the relatively productive ￿rms decline, market shares shift to less productive ￿rms, and rel-
atively weak ￿rms start operating. As a result, import liberalization leads to lower industry
productivity (negative selection) in the liberalizing country.3
1This has been documented recently by Broda and Weinstein (2006).
2An overview of the literature on international technology di⁄usion is presented in Keller (2004).
3The seminal work by Melitz (2003) analyzes multilateral liberalization. Unilateral liberalization in a
model with variable mark-ups is examined in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); these authors show in addition
that trade liberalization has a pro-competitive, productivity-raising impact in the short-run. Important
3While both the within and the between ￿rm channel has been emphasized in recent work,
relatively little is known on how the joint impact of selection and spillovers from imports
liberalization shapes the location decisions of ￿rms and the size of industries. This question
is central for welfare analysis. For one, technology spillovers have a positive e⁄ect while the
welfare e⁄ect through productivity selection can either be positive or negative. Consequently,
openness more likely improves welfare if spillovers are relatively strong.4 Moreover, policy
makers need to know how productivity selection across ￿rms works in order to adopt sound
policies towards ￿rm entry and exit.
We present evidence for a sample of industrialized countries over the period 1973 to 2002.
First, import liberalization lowers domestic productivity in the long-run, a ￿nding which is
consistent with recent models of ￿rm heterogeneity because unilateral liberalization lowers
the pro￿ts of domestic versus foreign exporters. Second, if imports are relatively technology-
intensive, liberalization also generates technological learning that can on net raise domestic
productivity. We also study the impact of entry and exit on the productivity consequences
of import liberalization. In the short run of up to three years, there are productivity gains
in the liberalizing country. In addition, the selection e⁄ect is muted when ￿rm turnover is
low or entry regulation is high. Overall, the results support models in which trade triggers
both substantial selection and technological learning.
What is the evidence on ￿rm selection and spillovers recently? Empirical work has
extensions of Melitz (2003) include Demidova (2006) and Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu (2006). Earlier papers
showing that unilateral trade liberalization in the presence of free entry can lower welfare by shifting ￿rms
from the domestic country to foreign countries include Horstmann and Markusen (1986).
4A case where trade liberalization with heterogeneous ￿rms and no technology spillovers leads to lower
welfare is discussed in Demidova (2006).
4emphasized that increased openness can generate changes in competition and market share
reallocations that add up to substantial domestic productivity improvements (Pavcnik 2002).
At the same time, some studies point to a negative, not positive selection e⁄ect from increased
openness. In their study of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Venezuela, for example,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) demonstrate that FDI has lowered productivity among domestic
plants, with one possible explanation being that foreign ￿rms hire away the best workers. As
for technology spillovers, Keller (2002) and others have shown that imports generate bene￿ts
from foreign R&D investments. Moreover, Gri¢ th, Harrison, and van Reenen (2006) ￿nd
evidence for technology spillovers through outward FDI. And while the pioneering work
found little evidence for learning from exporting (Bernard and Jensen 1999, Clerides, Lach,
and Tybout 1998), the evidence is stronger in some more recent papers (van Biesebroeck
2005, De Loecker 2007). Indeed, surveys of the evidence on productivity gains from trade in
micro studies conclude that foreign competition often improves intra-plant e¢ ciency, citing
technology spillovers as a possible explanation (Tybout 2003).
These ￿ndings notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge there is no research that
quanti￿es the relative importance of the competition and learning impact of imports in a
single framework. This paper combines the broad coverage and focus on technology invest-
ments in industry studies with ￿rm-level statistics, speci￿cally the typical size of ￿rms across
industries. The analysis encompasses about 85% of all manufacturing R&D in the world.
Moreover, we observe R&D spending by both importers and exporters. This information
on technology investments is crucial; without it, learning externalities will likely be missed.
Studies of the e⁄ects of trade liberalization using micro data rarely employ rich information
5on technology investments, in part because the information is unavailable: the micro unit is
often a plant, whereas R&D decisions are made at the ￿rm level.
The relatively large cross-sectional dimension of this study, twenty-two industries in six-
teen countries, means that our ￿ndings are representative for many economies. Another
advantage of our setting is that we trace out productivity and imports dynamics over three
decades (years 1973 to 2002), because it allows to distinguish the long-run from the short-
run e⁄ects of imports liberalization. The detailed information technology investments for a
broad sample comes at the cost of having no micro-level information on market shares. At
the same time, we have data on the number of ￿rms by industry. This re￿ ects net entry
rates (entry minus exit), picking up an extensive margin in the ￿rm selection process. More-
over, information on the number of ￿rms is used to compute average ￿rm size. In models
of productivity heterogeneity, productivity and average ￿rm size typically move together,
because the reason why some ￿rms are small (large) in the ￿rst place is that they have low
(high) productivity. Therefore, changes in average ￿rm size triggered by imports gives an
alternative measure of selection that can be studied.
This research also contributes to what we know about the churning of ￿rms across in-
dustries and countries. It is well-known that churning across industries varies considerably
in terms of entry and exit barriers (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1988). Moreover, re-
cent work has shown that di⁄erences in entry regulation across countries plays an important
role in explaining countries￿growth experiences (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer 2002)). We highlight one major reason for ￿rm churning, namely increases in foreign
competition through imports. Consistent with recent work, we show that variation in nat-
6ural and policy-induced entry barriers are important in explaining productivity outcomes.
In the present context, high entry barriers slow down the exit of relatively productive, and
the entry of relatively unproductive domestic ￿rms, thereby raising productivity. Of course,
as this research emphasizes, the overall welfare impact of entry regulation will depend on its
e⁄ect on both selection and technological learning.
Related to our work is the paper by Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2006). These authors
extend the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model to study trade-induced changes in prices
and mark-ups with data on European industries. Chen, Imbs, and Schott￿ s work addresses
the competition e⁄ects of trade, both short-run and long-run, whereas the present paper
focuses on long-run predictions in a framework where imports can a⁄ect both the degree of
competition and technological learning.5
In the remainder of the paper, we ￿rst introduce the data in section 2 before outlining
the estimation approach in section 3. This is followed by the empirical results (section 4).
Section 5 provides a concluding discussion.
2 Data
Since technical discoveries tend to emerge in an uneven way across industries, we study trade
and productivity at the industry-level. During the 1990s, most of the technological break-
5Some parallels also exist with work by Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2007), who an-
alyze ￿rm selection and agglomeration e⁄ects on productivity. This paper di⁄ers, ￿rst, in that our focus is
on technology spillovers, not agglomeration economies. Second, ￿rm selection and spillovers have qualita-
tively di⁄erent productivity implications in our setting, namely negative for unilateral trade liberalization,
and positive for technological learning. In contrast, Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux exam-
ine the e⁄ect of larger market size, which raises productivity, albeit di⁄erentially, via both selection and
agglomeration.
7throughs came in the information and communication technology (ICT) industries. While
the ICT innovations were important even at the manufacturing or the economy wide-level,
for us a su¢ cient degree of industry detail is crucial. This paper examines manufacturing
disaggregated into twenty-two industries.6 The classi￿cation allows to isolate key sectors
such as computers and communication equipment technologies.
The analysis covers manufacturing activity in seventeen industrialized countries.7 Through-
out the three decades of our sample (the years 1973 to 2002), these countries, located in four
continents, accounted for a large portion of the world￿ s manufacturing activity. The technol-
ogy trends we study are truly global in the sense that during these three decades the sample
encompasses more than 85% of the world￿ s manufacturing R&D investments.
Internationally comparable ￿gures on employment, output, and sectoral prices come from
Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) database (van Ark et al. 2005) for the
years 1979-2002. The GGDC project represents an extension of the OECD￿ s STAN database
in that output and price measures for sectors that were key drivers of technological change
are separately included. We have combined this with information on employment, output
and sectoral prices for 1973-78 from the OECD￿ s STAN database (OECD 2008a).8 Also
from the STAN database comes the information on physical capital investment. Figures
on R&D spending are from the ANBERD database (OECD 2008b), and information on
bilateral trade at the industry level comes from the BTD database (OECD 2008c).9
6They are listed in Table 6.
7The countries are listed in Table 3.
8More details on the sources and construction of this data is given in Acharya and Keller (2007).
9The output measure is the value added produced in an industry. Labor services are measured in terms of
the number of workers. Information on physical capital investment has been employed to construct capital
stocks, and similarly, we have calculated R&D stocks based on data on R&D spending.
8This provides a rich basis for the empirical work in that the sample goes beyond earlier
studies in terms of variation in the country, industry, and time dimensions. In addition, we
have obtained ￿gures on output and the number of establishments in order to study ￿rm
size dynamics. This information comes from data collected by the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and prepared by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). It yields
a measure of average ￿rm size that can shed additional light on market share reallocations
analyzed by heterogeneous ￿rm models.10 The UNIDO data provides average ￿rm size
information for the years 1981 to 2002 at the three-digit ISIC level.11
This study also employs measures on ￿rm entry and exit from the following sources.
First, there is information on the regulation of entry from the World Bank Investment
Climate Surveys, as reported in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002).
Figure 1 shows the number of procedures that need to be completed to start a business across
countries, with high numbers indicating relatively strong entry barriers. In our sample, this
varies from sixteen in Italy to two in Australia and Canada, while the number for the U.S.,
with four, is also relatively low. The dynamics of ￿rm entry and exit also varies due to
industry-speci￿c characteristics. We employ data on U.S. gross turnover (equal to ￿rm entry
plus ￿rm exit divided by number of ￿rms) derived from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson
(1988). Since for all industries, policy barriers in the U.S. are relatively low, the variation
10For the purposes of this paper, we use the terms establishment and ￿rm synonymously. To the best
of our knowledge, cross-country, cross-industry data for a broad sample that allows this distinction at the
empirical level does not exist. In any case, our de￿nition of average size, industry output divided by the
number of establishments, corresponds to the notion of a ￿rm in Melitz (2003) and others.
11For a small number of industries, this is more aggregated than the information on R&D and trade
volumes, and in these cases we apply the three-digit average ￿rm size ￿gures to all sectors that belong to
this three-digit ISIC industry. See Table A1 for details.
9in gross turnover can be viewed as picking up natural, or not policy-induced, barriers to
entry and exit. For a limited set of countries, it has recently become possible to estimate
comparable turnover rates by country and industry (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta
2007). Figure 2 shows this data for Italy and the UK. As expected from the relatively high
entry barriers in Italy across the board (Figure 1), turnover rates in Italy are lower for each
industry. At the same time, Figure 2 con￿rms that the industry ordering of turnover is
similar across countries.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for some key variables. There are typically about
10,000 observations, which re￿ ects the fact that there are only a few missing observations.12
The exception is information on average ￿rm size, which is available for a somewhat smaller
number of years and countries. Both R&D and productivity have grown over these three
decades, with R&D growth generally outpacing productivity growth (Table 2). At the same
time, the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, of around 3% per year, is itself quite
high by historic standards. The average growth of imports from the U.S. is almost twice
as large as the growth of U.S. R&D over this period. In terms of our study, the increased
product market integration helps to identify any productivity selection and spillovers that
imports might initiate.
Tables 3 and 4 provide some initial information on the sample variation across countries.
Over these three decades, the United States has been the productivity leader, with the highest
average productivity level, and Canada is a close second in the productivity ranking (Table
3). Productivity growth was highest in South Korea, in part because it is still catching-up
12With 17 countries, 22 industries, and 30 years, there are 11,220 possible observations.
10to the more advanced countries. The country with the second-highest productivity growth
rate is Finland, which may be related to high productivity growth in industries such as
communication equipment.
The United States is the largest creator of new technology in the world, measured by
its R&D spending (Table 4). This is the reason for our focus on selection and spillovers
associated with U.S. R&D and imports. The importance of U.S. imports relative to domestic
production becomes clear from Table 5. The U.S.￿important role for Canada is well known,
with U.S. imports being almost three-fourths of domestic value added on average in the
1990s. But also in Ireland and Australia, U.S. imports are large relative to the domestic
industry size, and even in the large OECD countries such as Germany or the U.K., U.S.
imports amount to between 3% and 15% of domestic industry size.
Tables 6 and 7 show the variation across industries. Most technology creation as measured
by R&D occurs in the aircraft, motor vehicles industries, and communications equipment
industries, but also computers, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals account for a relatively large
share of total R&D (Table 6). While this is based on R&D in the United States, the distri-
bution of R&D across industries in other OECD countries is in fact quite similar. Finally,
Table 7 looks at the importance of U.S. imports by industry, and shows that the relative
importance of imports from the U.S. is highest for the aircraft and computer industries,
followed by instruments and communication equipment.
In the following section we describe the estimation approach.
113 Estimation
This paper analyzes productivity dynamics by extending the R&D-and-production function
framework pioneered by Griliches (1979) and others to include imports. Earlier work has
yielded a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and total factor productivity.
R&D spending in one ￿rm may raise the productivity of other ￿rms if there are technological
externalities, or spillovers. These may also be important at the industry- or country-level.
When ￿rms with di⁄erent productivity levels compete, market share reallocations are
an independent reason for changes in industry productivity. In the context of international
trade, an increase in imports is indicative of a relatively less pro￿table competitive position
of domestic ￿rms. With free entry, this lowers average productivity at home. One reason
for a surge in imports is often that the domestic market has become more accessible in
terms of trade costs (e.g. tari⁄s, non-tari⁄barriers, or transport costs have fallen). Another
reason for increased imports might be that an increase in R&D spending has made foreign
￿rms relatively more competitive. If so, this reallocates export opportunities away from
domestic and towards foreign ￿rms. The reduction of expected pro￿ts for domestic ￿rms
will shift domestic market shares from high- to low-productivity ￿rms, thereby lowering
industry productivity.13
Thus, an increase in imports and foreign R&D may lower domestic productivity through
selection, and it may raise domestic productivity to the extent that there are signi￿cant tech-
13See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Demidova (2006) and Falvey, Greenaway, and Yu (2006) for details.











￿c0mcc0it + "cit; (1)
where tfpcit is a measure of total factor productivity in industry i and year t of country c;with
i = 1;:::;22, c = 1;:::;16; and t = 1973;:::;2002. Since the assumption of constant returns to
scale is not rejected, we impose it and construct TFP as tfpcit = ycit￿￿lcit￿(1￿￿)kcit; where
ycit is value added, lcit employment (number of workers), and kcit is the capital stock, all in




c0it in equation (1) are domestic and foreign R&D (in logs), and mcc0it is
the log imports of country c￿ s industry i from the same industry in country c0 in year t: The
variable "cit is an error term that will be de￿ned below.
In principle, we could study the relationships between all OECD countries symmetrically.
However, relatively small countries such as Belgium or Denmark are unlikely to have a
comparable impact on other OECD countries as have larger countries. As shown above, the
United States, in particular, is relatively large in terms of R&D and exports to all other
sample countries, and for the most part we focus on imports- and R&D e⁄ects of the U.S.
in 16 other OECD countries. Equation (1) is specialized to








Git + "cit; (2)
14Acharya and Keller (2007) obtain production function elasticity estimates for these industries, showing
that the labor (capital) elasticity is very close to the labor (one minus the labor) share. We have also employed
alternative TFP measures that incorporate information on industry-speci￿c factor shares; as Table A3 shows,







Git are log R&D stocks in the U.S., Japan, and Germany, and mUcit
is log imports from the United States. Japan and Germany are the second- and third-
largest countries in terms of R&D in the sample, and they may have signi￿cant e⁄ects on
productivity independent of U.S. R&D and exports.15
In order to better assess the relative importance of selection and technology spillovers,
we also add the interaction of imports with R&D
tfpcit = ￿ + ￿Ur
f












Git. The parameter ￿e indicates whether the productivity
impact of U.S. imports varies with the technology embodied in these imports, which we
capture by multiplying U.S. imports with U.S. R&D.
Two generic issues in estimating equation (3) are possible omitted variables and endo-
geneity. To address these, we employ two di⁄erent estimators: (1) ￿xed e⁄ects (￿ within￿ )
estimation and (2) dynamic instrumental variable (IV) estimation. In the former, the error
term is speci￿ed as
"
w
cit = ￿ci + ￿t + ucit; (4)
where ￿ci are deterministic ￿xed e⁄ects for each country-by-industry combination, ￿t is a
￿xed e⁄ect for each year, and ucit is a mean-zero but possibly heteroskedastic disturbance.
The ￿ci ￿xed e⁄ects will control for any heterogeneity across industries that is omitted from
15Adding R&D variables of other major countries (e.g., France, the U.K., Canada, or Italy) does not a⁄ect
our key results.
14(3) and constant over time.
Results using the IV estimator proposed by Arellano, Blundell, Bond, and others are also
presented (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 2000). In that case, the regression
error is given by
"b
cit = ￿c + &i + ￿t + ￿cit
￿cit = ￿￿cit￿1 + ucit
(5)
Here, ￿c, &i, and ￿t are deterministic ￿xed e⁄ects for each country, industry, and year,
respectively. The random shock ￿cit changes over time following an AR(1). This approach
yields moment conditions for combining equations in the variables￿levels with equations in
the variables￿di⁄erences for a so-called System GMM approach. In both sets of equations,
one essentially uses lagged values to construct instrumental variables for current variables.
An advantage of the Systems GMM estimator is that it deals with possible endogeneity.
The cost is in the form of additional assumptions and added complexity, as well as a smaller
sample due to the lags needed to construct the instruments. In this case, we ￿nd qualitatively
similar results using either estimation method.16
16We have also considered the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator, and found that the results are quite
similar in this context; see van Biesebroeck (2004) who analyzes the robustness of several related estimators
more generally.
154 Estimation results
4.1 Productivity selection and spillovers from imports
This section presents our empirical results. We begin with ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates in Table
8 before turning to IV results in Table 9. The ￿rst column of Table 8 gives results for the
following speci￿cation:









where ￿ci and ￿t are ￿xed e⁄ects that are treated as parameters. The sample consists of
the years 1973 to 2002, though the sample is somewhat smaller because all independent
variables are lagged by two years in order to reduce endogeneity problems.17 The domestic
R&D elasticity is 0.11, and those for U.S., Japan, and Germany are about 0.24, 0.21, and
0.07, respectively; these ￿gures are in line with what earlier studies found (see Griliches
1995). Replacing the U.S. R&D variable with imports from the U.S., the import coe¢ cient
is negative (column 2).
When both U.S. imports and R&D are included together with their interaction mUcit ￿
r
f
Uit, it is the latter that is estimated to have a positive e⁄ect on productivity; the direct
U.S. imports and R&D impact actually lower domestic productivity (column 4). This is
consistent with substantial productivity selection through the product market impacts of
foreign R&D and imports, as predicted by heterogeneous ￿rm models. In addition, the
17Since we want to estimate the e⁄ects from U.S. imports and R&D, we also eliminate the 22 U.S. industries
from the sample; it consists of the remaining 16 OECD countries, times 22 industries.
16positive coe¢ cient on the imports-R&D interaction indicates that if the imports from the
U.S. are highly technology-intensive, this generates technological externalities that raise
productivity in the importing country.
The IV results are presented in Table 9. The ￿rst speci￿cation is comparable to column
(3) in Table 1, except that the IV regression has about 1,000 fewer observations due to lags
needed to construct instruments. According to both the ￿xed e⁄ects and the IV results,
U.S. R&D raises domestic productivity while imports from the U.S. tend to lower it. We
also report Hansen￿ s J from the test of overidentifying restrictions. The p-value of 0.655
indicates that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a set are valid.18
Adding the imports-R&D interaction yields a positive coe¢ cient, as before (Table 9, column
2). Tables 8 and 9 also report the 90% con￿dence interval for the U.S. imports and U.S.
R&D impacts. While the mean imports e⁄ect is close to zero (-0.02 for the ￿xed e⁄ects, and
-0.01 for the IV), the con￿dence interval covers both sizable positive and negative elasticities,
ranging at least from -0.09 to 0.06. Overall, the ￿xed e⁄ects and IV estimators lead to quite
similar results.
An important question is whether our the estimated US R&D- and imports e⁄ects are
truly re￿ ecting productivity selection as emphasized in recent ￿rm heterogeneity models, or
indeed something else. To address this issue, we utilize information on the number of ￿rms
by industry and analyze the dynamics of average ￿rm size and the number of ￿rms.
As noted above, in the typical ￿rm heterogeneity model, productivity and ￿rm size move
together. This means that the average ￿rms size in an industry should be a⁄ected in the
18The set of instruments is given at the bottom of Table 10.
17same way as productivity by U.S. R&D and U.S. imports. Table 10 shows regressions of
the log of average ￿rms size as an alternative dependent variable to TFP. We also employ
the number of ￿rms in an industry, which directly re￿ ects (net) entry and exit. Unilateral
import liberalization leads to a lower threshold that a ￿rm￿ s productivity has to surpass
in order to break even. Thus, the lower industry productivity through unilateral import
liberalization should be associated with an increase in the number of ￿rms. We examine this
in Table 10 by employing the (log) number of ￿rms as an alternative dependent variable.
TFP speci￿cations analogous to those in Table 8 for the years 1981-2002, for which the
number of ￿rm data is available, are shown as well.
We see, ￿rst, that U.S. R&D has a positive impact on productivity and ￿rm size, while
it has a negative e⁄ect on the number of ￿rms. The former provides additional support that
U.S. R&D generates technological learning, and the fact that productivity and average ￿rm
size are a⁄ected in the same way is consistent with recent heterogeneous ￿rm models. The
negative impact of U.S. R&D on the number of ￿rms in (3) and (6) suggests that relatively
productive ￿rms tend to bene￿t more from U.S. R&D than weaker ￿rms. Second, U.S.
imports a⁄ect productivity and ￿rm size qualitatively in the same way. High-technology
imports raise ￿rm size, low-tech imports reduce ￿rms size, and the average e⁄ect is close to
zero. From speci￿cation (6), the impact of U.S. imports on the number of ￿rms is the reverse:
the number of ￿rms goes up if the imports are low-technology, and the number of ￿rms falls
if imports are high-technology. The ￿nding suggests that a surge of imports unaccompanied
by technological learning leads to the net entry of relatively weak domestic ￿rms. It provides
strong evidence that we estimate the long run heterogeneous-￿rm selection e⁄ect, since in
18the typical homogenous-￿rm model a surge in imports would displace domestic ￿rms, not
add to their number.
How large are the selection and spillover e⁄ects quantitatively? The elasticity of TFP with
respect to U.S. imports and U.S. R&D is reported in Tables 8 and 9 at the bottom. The
average imports elasticity appears to be negative but close to zero; for these speci￿cations,
the values range from -3.7% to -1.0%. The impact of U.S. imports on domestic productivity
varies strongly, however, depending on how technology intensive imports are: for the ￿xed
e⁄ects speci￿cation (4) in Table 8, the value for the 5th percentile of the import elasticity
(low-technology imports) is -0.09, while at the 95th percentile (high-technology imports), it
is 0.06. respectively. Selection is generally quite important: about two thirds of all industries
experience lower productivity as a consequence of an increase in U.S. imports (speci￿cation
(4) in Table 8).
In contrast to imports, the average U.S. R&D elasticity is positive, at about 25%. From
the point of view of the importer, the amount of U.S. R&D determines whether imports from
the U.S. lead to higher or lower domestic productivity. For example, a change of U.S. R&D
spending from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with a 6.4 percentage points
increase in the imports elasticity (for (4), Table 8). With an average imports elasticity of
-2.0%, it is clear that how technology-intensive imports are is critical for the productivity
consequences in the liberalizing economy. Overall, the results are consistent with models in
which trade generates both major selection processes and technology spillovers.
The robustness of the estimates has been analyzed. We have, ￿rst, asked whether the
imports and R&D of other major countries such as Japan and Germany also generate a
19mix of selection and spillover e⁄ects, or whether these are speci￿c phenomena for the United
States.19 Second, the productivity variable is based on the same labor- and capital elasticities
for all industries. In Table A3, we report results for an alternative TFP variable, which is
based on input elasticities that vary by industry.20 Both sets of results are similar to those
discussed above.
The following section studies how ￿rm entry and exit a⁄ect spillover and selection e⁄ects.
4.2 Extensive margin-dynamics, selection, and spillovers
Our analysis of how ￿rm dynamics shape selection due to imports begins by employing mea-
sures on the gross turnover of ￿rms compiled by Bartelsmann, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta
(2007). This information varies both by industry and by country, which is attractive because
￿rm dynamics may vary importantly across both dimensions (recall Figure 2).21 We de￿ne
an indicator variable ILT
ci which is equal to one if gross turnover in a particular industry is
in the lowest quartile of all industries￿turnover. Turnover may be low in these industries
both due to certain industry characteristics such as high set-up costs and heavy entry and
exit regulation. As a result, such industries are characterized by relatively low entry and
exit rates, which one would expect to slow down the ￿rm selection process.
19In Table A2, we compare the results for the U.S. with those for Japan and Germany. Table A2￿ s column
(1) repeats the earlier results for the U.S. from Table 8, (4), while columns (2) and (3) report analogous
results for Japan and Germany, respectively.
20The alternative TFP indices use ~ ￿i as labor￿ s share, which is the median labor share for each industry
i, together with the assumption of CRS. Most of the variation in the labor shares is in the industry, not
country or time dimension.
21There is country-speci￿c data for eight of our sample countries; for the others, we employ the average
values. The turnover values are averages from annual data, typically for the period 1984-98, see Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2007), Table 1.
20In Table 11, we present evidence on this by examining whether the impact of US R&D
and imports is signi￿cantly di⁄erent in low-turnover industries. Column (1) reports again the
results of (3), Table 8 as a benchmark. Column (2) adds the domestic R&D-low turnover
interaction, which is not signi￿cant. Columns (3) and (4) indicate that the productivity
bene￿ts of US R&D are about one third lower in low turnover-industries. This suggests that
there is a reduced level of within-￿rm technological learning in industries that are among
the least vibrant in terms of ￿rm entry and exit.
The US imports-low turnover interaction in column (4) enters with a positive sign. This
says that relatively low ￿rm turnover is associated with smaller productivity losses due to
selection triggered by a surge in imports. Interestingly, the interaction coe¢ cient is equal
to 0.048, which is the same absolute value as the imports selection coe¢ cient (at -0.048).
Thus, if ￿rm turnover is low, this can completely bring to a halt the impact from selection.
One concern is that country-speci￿c turnover rates may be endogenous in these regres-
sions. While it is unlikely that endogeneity plays a major role since we do not employ annual
information on turnover, we address this issue further by using information on gross turnover
in US industries throughout, instead of the country-speci￿c turnover data. The results are
shown in column (5) of Table 11. The impact of ￿rm dynamics on spillovers and selection is
unchanged: U.S. R&D generates a lower bene￿t in low-turnover industries, and U.S. imports
trigger a smaller productivity loss in low-turnover industries. This suggests that the results
with country-speci￿c turnover information are not importantly driven by endogeneity.22
22This is also consistent with Dunne and Roberts (1991) who argue that variation in turnover across
industries in the US is likely going to be similar to the industry variation in other countries. Note, however,
that the domestic R&D impact in low turnover industries is larger when US- compared to when country-
speci￿c turnover data is employed.
21Next, we examine the impact of policy-induced entry barriers. Let the indicator variable
IHR
c be equal to one if the observation is in the highest quartile in terms of the numbers
of procedures that need to be completed before a business can start operating, and zero
otherwise. We expect that a high degree of regulation will lead to a relatively low rate
of ￿rm entry. Table 12 shows these results. First, consider the impact of domestic R&D
in a high-regulation environment. The domestic R&D-high regulation interaction is ￿rst
positive (speci￿cations (1) and (2)), but it is negative in the full speci￿cation (3), suggesting
that domestic R&D yields smaller productivity gains in a highly regulated environment (not
signi￿cant at standard levels). Second, there is no major di⁄erence between regulated and
not regulated industries in terms of their technology spillovers from U.S. R&D (columns
(2) and (3)). At the same time, the imports e⁄ect on productivity is signi￿cantly lower in
highly regulated industries (column (3)). This is consistent with entry regulation being to
some extent a shield against the negative impact of imports-induced long-run productivity
selection.
The last column of Table 12 includes both the low turnover- and high regulation variables
jointly, which allows to see whether they have independent e⁄ects. The productivity impact
of a surge in US imports is reduced by both a high degree of regulation and a low level of ￿rm
turnover. In contrast, while technology spillovers from the U.S. are generally higher in high
turnover industries￿ the U.S. R&D-low turnover coe¢ cient is negative￿ , there is no evidence
that technology spillovers from the US are lower speci￿cally due to high levels of regulation.
Overall, we ￿nd that factors slowing down entry and exit can have a major in￿ uence on
market share reallocations between ￿rms with di⁄erent productivities.
224.3 Selection over time
In the light of these results, it is plausible that time is another determinant of the size of the
selection e⁄ect: natural entry barriers and entry regulation should have its strongest impact
in the short-run, when it is very costly to overcome these barriers. In the heterogeneous
￿rm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), for example, unilateral import liberalization has
a positive impact on domestic productivity in the short-run, when the number of ￿rms at
home and abroad is given, and a negative impact in the long-run, when ￿rm entry and exit
has set in. More generally, the short-run response of industry productivity to additional
import competition might be quite di⁄erent from the long-run response.
To examine this empirically, we run a set of time-di⁄erenced regressions. Consider the
following equation
￿








q (mUcit) + ￿X
0 + vcit; (6)
where ￿qis the time-di⁄erence operator of length q; so that q = 1 are one-year di⁄erences,
q = 2 are two-year di⁄erences, and so forth. We consider q = 1;::;10, that is, one-year to
ten-year di⁄erences. One-year di⁄erences estimate a relatively short-run impact, while a time
horizon of one decade picks up a more long-run e⁄ect. As control variables, X; we include
changes in own R&D, Japanese, and German R&D, as well as time ￿xed e⁄ects.23 Also
23We also restrict the sample period to the years 1983 to 2002. Since the sample covers the years 1973 to
2002, 1983 is the ￿rst year for which we can form ten-year di⁄erences. This ensures that the results are not
a⁄ected by the inclusion or exclusion of the early years in our sample.
23results for time-di⁄erenced regressions with the R&D-Imports interaction will be shown:
￿





















0 + vcit: (7)
Table 13 reports the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 of equation (6) for di⁄erent time horizons, and
Figure 3 gives a graphical depiction of the average elasticities.24 The productivity e⁄ect of
imports is signi￿cantly positive for a one- to three-year time horizon. For the four- to six-
year time horizons, the imports e⁄ect is close to zero, while for a seven-year or longer time
horizon, the productivity impact of unilateral import liberalization is signi￿cantly negative.
Also shown in Figure 3 are the average TFP e⁄ects of imports based on the interaction
speci￿cation, equation (7), which are very similar. The fact that the imports e⁄ect almost
monotonically declines as the time horizon becomes longer is exactly what one expects if
productivity selection through ￿rm entry and exit at home and abroad is evolving over
time.25 Moreover, the ￿ndings strikingly con￿rm the predictions of recent heterogeneous
￿rm models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). By contrast, the marginal e⁄ect of US
R&D on productivity varies relatively little for di⁄erent time horizons.
To summarize, productivity selection from imports is moderated when ￿rm turnover is
low, entry regulation is high, and in general over short time horizons.
24As shown above, the impact of imports varies with their technology intensity.
25While small sample size precludes precise estimation for longer time di⁄erences, it appears that the
imports e⁄ect does not change any further beyond about 13 years.
245 Conclusions
Does importing a⁄ect domestic productivity through selection and technology spillovers? To
answer this question, we analyzed the productivity dynamics in response to U.S. exports
in several major countries. It is particularly revealing to look at changes triggered by US
exports, both because the U.S. is an important and sometimes even dominant trade partner,
and because the United States is the single most important source of technology creation in
the world, accounting for about 40% of the world￿ s R&D spending. To examine the impact
of imports, we study productivity dynamics at the industry-level. The analysis focuses on
the productivity e⁄ects of imports through selection and technology spillovers. Admittedly,
international product market competition need not take the form of trade, and productivity
might be a⁄ected by factors other than selection and spillovers. However, these mechanisms
are central to recent theoretical and empirical work, and they are much-emphasized in the
policy discussion as well. Our empirical results strikingly demonstrate that selection and
technology spillovers must ￿gure prominently in any successful explanation according to
which international trade a⁄ects productivity.
It would have been impossible to arrive at these results without extensive data. To this
end, we constructed a unique database on manufacturing inputs, outputs, and international
trade volumes for most of the industrialized world and a relatively long thirty-year sample
period. The analysis includes su¢ cient detail to isolate major technology drivers such as
the computer and communication equipment industries. This is combined with information
on the typical ￿rm￿ s size to trace out market share reallocations in response to a surge in
25imports.
Our main conclusions are as follows: First, import liberalization lowers domestic pro-
ductivity in the long-run through the selection e⁄ect. This con￿rms the prediction of recent
models of ￿rm heterogeneity because unilateral liberalization shifts pro￿ts from domestic
to foreign exporters. Second, if imports are relatively technology-intensive, liberalization
also generates technological learning that can on net raise domestic productivity. Third, we
show that in the short-run of up to about three years, a surge in imports raises domestic
productivity. Because the number of ￿rms at home and abroad does not change much in
the short-run, new competition from foreign ￿rms has a pro-competitive e⁄ect. We also ￿nd
that the selection e⁄ect is muted when ￿rm turnover is low or entry regulation is high.
Overall, the results indicate that market share reallocations between ￿rms in response to
changes in foreign competition are important. Moreover, the evidence lines up very well with
recent heterogeneous ￿rm trade models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Speci￿cally,
we ￿nd that ￿rm selection induced by imports liberalization raises domestic productivity in
the short-run, and it reduces it in the long-run. The level of entry regulation matters for
the extent that ￿rm churning in response to import competition contributes to the overall
change in productivity. This ￿nding is consistent with an emphasis on ￿rm dynamics as a
key explanation for performance di⁄erences across countries.26
At the same time, the evidence shows that we need models in which imports lead to both
selection and technology spillovers. The inclusion of both selection and spillovers matters
more for long-run than short-run policy advice, since as we have seen in the short-run a surge
26See Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2007) and Ahn (2000) for an overview.
26in imports yields productivity gains. In the long-run, the net impact of imports hinges on
the relative size of the selection and the technology spillover e⁄ect. If new imports primarily
amount to increased product market competition, the selection e⁄ect dominates and domestic
productivity falls. In contrast, if imports are a signi￿cant source of new technology, this can
outweigh the competition e⁄ect, leading to a long-run increase in domestic productivity.
It is plausible that our results analogously apply to exports and foreign direct investment,
although at this point this is a conjecture.
It is also important to ask why most studies to date tend to ￿nd that productivity rises
with increased foreign competition, whereas our results are not as clear-cut in this respect.
We can think of at least two reasons for this. First, this study has examined changes in
import competition over roughly three decades. This sample period is substantially longer
than what is typically considered in studies of the productivity e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
We believe that the relatively long sample period is crucial for estimating the long-run
selection e⁄ect of imports predicted by in￿ uential recent papers. At the same time, for
relatively short time horizons, we ￿nd a pro-competitive e⁄ect from import liberalization.
From this perspective, our results are not so much in con￿ ict with existing results as that
they add a new ￿nding, on the long-run impact of import liberalization.
Another reason, not mutually exclusive, might be that in the presence of increased for-
eign competition in fact there is technology upgrading and learning taking place.27 While
relatively few micro studies of trade liberalization employ data on technology investments, it
27There is evidence that ￿rms make technology investments to prepare for more intensive competition,
which by itself might lead to higher productivity. An example is Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi, and Sokolo⁄
(2002).
27is quite possible that unobserved simultaneous technology investments are a⁄ecting the ob-
served productivity levels.28 Future research will have to analyze the importance of these and
possibly other determinants of the impact of increased openness on domestic productivity
and welfare.
28In this regard, the papers by Bustos (2007) and Verhoogen (2007) are noteworthy.
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33Table 1: Summary statistics for key variables
Variable Obs Mean Stdev
TFP 9,659 2.36 0.72
US Imports 10,098 11.54 1.98
US R&D 10,176 9.00 1.54
US Imports x US R&D 9,738 105.33 30.23
Domestic R&D 9,525 5.38 2.28
Japan R&D 10,560 7.48 2.45
Germany R&D 10,432 6.76 2.58
Av. firm size 5,433 8.77 1.44
All variables in logarithmsTable 2: Sample dynamics
Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Stdev Obs Mean Stdev of Mean
TFP 4916 2.11 0.74 4743 2.62 0.61 0.51
Domestic R&D 4759 4.95 2.38 4766 5.81 2.09 0.86
US R&D 5248 8.70 1.56 4928 9.33 1.45 0.63
US Imports 5280 10.99 1.91 4818 12.14 1.88 1.16
Japan R&D 5632 6.91 2.30 4928 8.14 2.46 1.22
Germany R&D 5632 6.28 2.62 4800 7.33 2.41 1.05
Av. Firm size 2339 8.48 1.37 3094 9.00 1.44 0.52
All variables in logarithms
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002Table 3: Productivity across countries
Growth 
Obs Mean Stdev Obs Mean Stdev of Mean
Australia 296 2.25 0.47 280 2.62 0.50 0.37
Belgium 328 2.17 0.59 308 2.76 0.52 0.59
Canada 352 2.42 0.68 308 2.87 0.50 0.45
Denmark 322 2.13 0.69 294 2.43 0.53 0.30
Finland 348 1.88 0.64 308 2.55 0.61 0.68
France 316 2.27 0.74 308 2.71 0.56 0.45
UK 322 1.98 0.69 308 2.64 0.57 0.66
Germany 350 2.13 0.60 308 2.54 0.47 0.41
Ireland 165
Italy 346 2.19 0.79 308 2.59 0.42 0.40
Japan 346 1.96 0.80 308 2.49 0.67 0.53
Korea 352 1.53 0.94 308 2.28 0.78 0.75
Netherlands 322 2.20 0.71 308 2.61 0.46 0.41
Norway 346 2.16 0.75 308 2.47 0.49 0.31
Spain 230 2.45 0.60 308 2.69 0.62 0.25
Sweden 340 2.04 0.65 308 2.56 0.63 0.52
United States 322 2.54 0.69 308 2.93 0.56 0.39
Table 4: R&D across countries
Growth 
Obs Mean Stdev Obs Mean Stdev of Mean
Australia 352 4.15 1.81 308 5.29 1.14 1.14
Belgium 22 308 5.17 1.62
Canada 352 5.14 1.86 308 5.94 1.72 0.81
Denmark 352 3.32 2.17 308 4.01 2.13 0.69
Finland 352 3.41 1.65 308 4.93 1.18 1.52
France 352 6.51 1.72 308 7.35 1.53 0.84
UK 352 6.86 1.61 308 7.14 1.56 0.28
Germany 352 6.70 2.12 300 7.82 1.54 1.13
Ireland 198 308 3.17 1.86
Italy 346 5.11 2.05 308 6.31 1.62 1.19
Japan 352 7.37 1.51 308 8.68 1.32 1.31
Korea 154
Netherlands 352 4.86 2.07 308 5.58 1.70 0.72
Norway 333 3.70 1.69 308 4.48 1.24 0.77
Spain 352 4.25 2.12 308 5.57 1.26 1.32
Sweden 340 4.94 1.84 308 5.73 1.55 0.78
United States 328 8.70 1.56 308 9.33 1.45 0.63
All variables in logs
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002Table 5: The importance of imports from the United States by partner country
Import Import
Obs Share* Obs Share* Change
Australia 352 0.11 308 0.15 0.04
Belgium 352 0.08 308 0.12 0.04
Canada 352 0.47 308 0.73 0.26
Denmark 346 0.03 308 0.04 0.01
Finland 352 0.03 308 0.04 0.01
France 352 0.03 308 0.03 0.01
UK 352 0.15 308 0.08 -0.07
Germany 352 0.02 308 0.03 0.01
Ireland 240 0.13 294 0.15 0.01
Italy 352 0.05 308 0.03 -0.01
Japan 352 0.02 308 0.04 0.02
Korea 198 0.09
Netherlands 352 0.05 308 0.11 0.06
Norway 352 0.06 308 0.09 0.02
Spain 322 0.04 308 0.04 -0.01
Sweden 352 0.07 306 0.05 -0.02
*Median ratio of imports from US to domestic value added across industries
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002Table 6: US R&D by industry*
Growth 
Obs Mean Stdev Obs Mean Stdev of Mean
Food products 256 8.68 0.19 224 9.11 0.03 0.43
Textiles 256 6.73 0.22 224 7.54 0.17 0.80
Wood products 256 7.94 0.23 224 7.22 0.19 -0.72
Paper products 256 8.54 0.23 224 9.14 0.23 0.60
Petroleum products 256 9.41 0.13 224 9.44 0.13 0.03
Chemicals 256 10.16 0.27 224 10.82 0.07 0.66
Pharmaceuticals 256 9.87 0.24 224 10.79 0.25 0.92
Rubber & plastics 256 8.23 0.13 224 8.82 0.25 0.59
Non-metallic mineral prod. 256 8.19 0.18 224 8.43 0.09 0.24
Iron and steel 256 8.05 0.13 224 7.83 0.10 -0.21
Non-ferrous metals 256 8.05 0.04 224 8.05 0.07 0.00
Metal products 256 8.39 0.15 224 8.86 0.15 0.46
Machinery and eq. 160 9.44 0.32 224 10.06 0.20 0.62
Computers 256 5.29 1.64 224 10.39 1.40 5.10
Elect. Machinery 160 9.47 0.31 224 9.78 0.20 0.31
Communication eq. 160 10.24 0.08 224 11.25 1.01 1.01
Instruments 256 10.06 0.25 224 10.91 0.27 0.85
Motor vehicles 256 10.87 0.12 224 11.33 0.08 0.47
Ships 160 8.52 0.37 224 7.42 0.23 -1.10
Aircraft 256 11.94 0.08 224 11.86 0.18 -0.08
Railroad equipment 256 6.85 0.65 224 8.13 0.15 1.29
Other manufacturing 256 7.45 0.58 224 7.99 0.12 0.54
* log of U.S. R&D stock
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002Table 7: The importance of US imports by industry
Import Import
Obs Share* Obs Share* Change
Food products 239 0.04 219 0.03 -0.01
Textiles 239 0.03 219 0.04 0.01
Wood products 239 0.05 219 0.05 0.00
Paper products 239 0.03 219 0.03 0.01
Petroleum products 234 0.08 219 0.07 -0.01
Chemicals 234 0.14 219 0.13 -0.02
Pharmaceuticals 234 0.05 219 0.09 0.04
Rubber & plastics 234 0.03 219 0.05 0.02
Non-metallic mineral prod. 239 0.01 219 0.02 0.00
Iron and steel 234 0.01 219 0.01 0.00
Non-ferrous metals 234 0.10 219 0.09 -0.01
Metal products 234 0.04 219 0.02 -0.02
Machinery and eq. 229 0.09 219 0.12 0.02
Computers 229 1.03 219 0.99 -0.05
Elect. Machinery 229 0.09 219 0.12 0.02
Communication eq. 229 0.17 217 0.24 0.07
Instruments 234 0.36 219 0.36 0.00
Motor vehicles 234 0.05 219 0.06 0.00
Ships 234 0.02 219 0.03 0.01
Aircraft 213 0.88 205 1.13 0.25
Railroad equipment 229 0.02 219 0.06 0.05
Other manufacturing 239 0.02 219 0.04 0.02
*Median ratio of imports from US to domestic value added across countries
1973 - 1987 1988 - 2002Table 8: Technology Transfer and Selection - Fixed Effects Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US R&D 0.239 0.247 -0.116
(0.015) (0.015) (0.035)
US Imports -0.023 -0.037 -0.303
(0.008) (0.008) (0.028)
US Imports x US R&D 0.031
(0.003)
Domestic R&D 0.110 0.190 0.113 0.101
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
JPN R&D 0.209 0.263 0.203 0.178
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
GER R&D 0.067 0.140 0.065 0.097
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
# of obs 7902 8169 7902 7902
Rsq 0.718 0.685 0.719 0.728
Elasticity US R&D 0.25
(5th%, 95th%) (0.14, 0.34)
Elasticity US Imports -0.02
(5th%, 95th%) (-0.09, 0.06)
Fixed effect regressions; dependent variable: log total factor productivity
All regressions include fixed effects at the country x industry level and for each year
Robust standard errors in parenthesesTable 9: Technology Transfer and Selection - System IV GMM Results
(1) (2)
US R&D 0.336 0.058
(0.048) (0.098)
US Imports -0.014 -0.201
(0.023) (0.065)
US Imports x US R&D 0.022
(0.007)
Domestic R&D 0.061 0.056
(0.020) (0.019)
JPN R&D 0.121 0.116
(0.043) (0.039)
GER R&D 0.070 0.078
(0.023) (0.022)
# of obs 6915 6915
AR(1) test -1.78 -2.01
[p-value] [0.08] [0.04]
AR(2) test 1.47 1.39
[p-value] [0.14] [0.17]
Hansen OverID J 4.16 3.56
[p-value] [0.655] [0.736]
Elasticity US R&D 0.26
(5th %, 95th %) (0.19, 0.33)
Elasticity US Imports -0.01
(5th %, 95th %) (-0.20, 0.06)
Dependent variable: log total factor productivity
All regressions include fixed effects for year, country, and industry
Robust Windmeijer (2005)-corrected standard errors in parentheses
Instruments: Domestic R&D lags4-6, US imports lags 2-6, 
Imports x US R&D lag 2, US R&D lag 2; other IVs contemporaneousTable 10: Productivity, size, and the number of firms
TFP Firm Size No. Firms TFP Firm Size No. Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US R&D 0.175 0.444 -0.156 -0.517 -0.743 0.103
(0.023) (0.039) (0.027) (0.053) (0.092) (0.063)
US Imports -0.008 0.031 0.002 -0.514 -0.842 0.193
(0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.040) (0.067) (0.046)
US Imports x US R&D 0.059 0.101 -0.022
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Domestic R&D 0.051 0.099 0.072 0.019 0.050 0.083
(0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.012) (0.025) (0.020)
JPN R&D 0.195 0.028 0.205 0.164 -0.029 0.217
(0.024) (0.035) (0.019) (0.012) (0.029) (0.019)
GER R&D 0.183 0.220 -0.064 0.197 0.244 -0.070
(0.022) (0.040) (0.027) (0.020) (0.036) (0.027)
# of obs 4844 5082 5092 4844 5082 5092
Rsq 0.639 0.300 0.245 0.670 0.334 0.248
Elasticity US R&D 0.245 0.447 -0.156
(5th %, 95th %) (-0.035, 0.350) (0.096, 0.766) (-0.226, -0.080)
Elasticity US Imports -0.032 0.070 -0.006
(5th%, 95th%) (-0.102, 0.167) (-0.124, 0.347) (-0.066, 0.037)
Fixed effects regressions; dependent variable on top of column, in logs; years 1981 to 2002
All regressions include fixed effects at the country x industry level and for each year; robust standard errors in parenthesesTable 11: Firm dynamics and selection
U.S. turnover data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic R&D 0.113 0.114 0.105 0.109 0.099
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
U.S. R&D 0.247 0.247 0.265 0.265 0.264
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
U.S. Imports -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.048 -0.047
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Dom R&D x Low Turnover -0.004 0.042 0.024 0.073
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
U.S. R&D x Low Turnover -0.094 -0.108 -0.146
(0.025) (0.027) (0.031)
U.S. Imp x Low Turnover 0.048 0.049
(0.013) (0.016)
Rsq 0.719 0.719 0.720 0.721 0.721
Fixed effects regression; dependent variable: log TFP
Each specification includes country x industry fixed effects, year fixed effects,
as well as JPN R&D and GER R&D (coefficients not reported)
Robust s.e. in parentheses; number of observations: 7,902
Country-specific turnover dataTable 12: Entry regulation, turnover, and selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. R&D 0.246 0.24 0.265 0.26
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
U.S. Imports -0.036 -0.036 -0.048 -0.058
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Domestic R&D 0.107 0.11 0.113 0.111
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
U.S. R&D x High Regulation 0.018 0.015 0.012
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
U.S. Imp x High Regulation 0.037 0.039
(0.014) (0.014)
Domestic R&D x High Regulation 0.015 0.004 -0.009 -0.014
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
U.S. R&D x Low Turnover -0.109
(0.027)
U.S. Imp x Low Turnover 0.047
(0.013)
Domestic R&D x Low Turnover 0.026
(0.018)
Rsq 0.719 0.719 0.720 0.721
Fixed effects regression; dependent variable: log TFP
All specifications include country x industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well as JPN R&D and GER R&D (coefficients not reported)
Robust s.e. in parentheses; number of observations: 7,902Table 13: Selection over time
Time horizon in years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U.S. Imports 0.016 0.022 0.013 0.001 -0.007 -0.012 -0.022 -0.028 -0.037 -0.045
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
U.S. R&D 0.296 0.321 0.331 0.309 0.308 0.305 0.302 0.292 0.281 0.27
(0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
# of observations 6120 6061 6002 5942 5800 5649 5498 5369 5239 5109
Time-differenced OLS regressions; dependent variable: change in log TFP; estimations exploit variation from changes over one year to changes over ten years
All regressions include the change in log domestic R&D, JPN, and GER R&D, and time fixed effects
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US Imports US Imports w/ interaction US R&DTable A1: The matching of industries for the firm size variable
Classification of this study ISIC 3 digit classification employed by UNIDO
1 Food, beverages, and tobacco 311 Food products 313 Beverages 314 Tobacco
2 Textiles, apparel, footwear 321 Textiles 322 Apparel 323 Leather products 324 Footwear
3 Wood products, furniture 331 Wood products 332 Furniture
4 Paper and printing 341 Paper  342 Printing, publishing
5 Petroleum products 353 Petroleum refineries 354 Petroleum products
6 Chemicals 351 Industrial chemicals
7 Pharmaceuticals 352 Other chemicals
8 Rubber & plastics 355 Rubber products 356 Plastic products
9 Non-metallic mineral prod. 361 Pottery, china 362 Glass 369 Other n-met. min.
10 Iron and steel 371 Iron and steel
11 Non-ferrous metals 372 Non-ferrous metals
12 Metal products 381 Metal products
13 Machinery and eq. 382 Machinery*
14 Computers
15 Elect. Machinery 383 Electrical machinery**
16 Communication eq.
17 Instruments 385 Instruments




22 Other manufacturing 390 Other manufacturing
Notes:
Information on the number of firms is form Nicita/Olarreaga (2006), based on UNIDO data; it is generally available for the years 1981-2002
Major exceptions are France, where 23% of all possible observations are available, as well as Ireland and Germany (about 45%).
* These values are applied to both industries 13 and 14
** These values are applied to both industries 15 and 16
*** These values are applied to industries 18, 19, 20, and 21Table A2: Productivity and Imports from the United States, Japan, and Germany
Imports Imports Imports
from the US from Japan from Germany
(Foreign = US) (Foreign = JPN) (Foreign = GER)
Foreign R&D -0.116 0.177 -0.040
(0.035) (0.027) (0.025)
Foreign Imports -0.303 -0.135 -0.108
(0.028) (0.017) (0.020)
Imports x Foreign R&D 0.031 0.015 0.013
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Domestic R&D 0.101 0.072 0.132
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
U.S. R&D 0.157 0.176
(0.014) (0.018)
JPN R&D 0.178 0.218
(0.016) (0.019)
GER R&D 0.097 0.050
(0.011) (0.011)
# of obs 7902 7891 7898
Rsq 0.728 0.737 0.710
Elasticity For R&D 0.25 0.33 0.12
(5th%, 95th%) (0.14, 0.34) (0.26, 0.39) (0.08, 0.15)
Elasticity For IMP -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(5th%, 95th%) (-0.09, 0.06) (-0.05, 0.02) (-0.05, 0.02)
Dependent variable: log total factor productivity
All regressions include fixed effects at the country x industry level and for each year
Robust standard errors in parenthesesTable A3: TFP Based on Industry-Specific Factor Shares
Fixed Effects System IV GMM
(1) (2)
US R&D -0.118 0.058
(0.034) (0.098)
US Imports -0.255 -0.164
(0.027) (0.065)
US Imports x US R&D 0.027 0.018
(0.003) (0.007)
Domestic R&D 0.075 0.037
(0.010) (0.021)
JPN R&D 0.170 0.123
(0.015) (0.038)
GER R&D 0.098 0.067
(0.011) (0.022)
# of obs 7902 6915
Hansen OverID J 9.38
[p-value] [0.153]
Dependent variable: log total factor productivity with industry-varying factor shares
Column (1) includes fixed effects for year and country-by-industry
Column (2) has fixed effects for country, year, and industry
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Windmeijer-corrected in column (2)
In column (1), all right hand side variables are lagged by two years
Instruments column (2): Domestic R&D lags4-6, US imports lags 2-6, 
Imports x US R&D lag 2, US R&D lag 2; other IVs contemporaneous